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Abstract
Competition authorities and regulatory agencies sometimes impose pricing restrictions
on ﬁrms with substantial market power — the “dominant” ﬁrms. We analyze the welfare
eﬀects of a ban on behaviour-based price discrimination in a two-period setting where the
market displays a competitive and a sheltered segment. A ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-
consumers” decreases prices in the sheltered segment, relaxes competition in the competitive
segment, increases the rival’s proﬁts, and may harm the dominant ﬁrm’s proﬁts. We show
that a ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” increases the dominant ﬁrm’s share
of the ﬁrst-period market. A ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” decreases prices in
the competitive segment, lowers the rival’s proﬁts, and augments the consumer surplus. In
particular, while second-period competition is relaxed by a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-
customers”, ﬁrst-period competition is intensiﬁed substantially, which leads to lower prices
“on-average” over the two periods. Our ﬁndings indicate that a dynamic two-period analysis
may lead to conclusions opposite to those drawn from a static one-period analysis.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Firms with signiﬁcant market power (“dominant” ﬁrms) are typically treated diﬀerently under
competition law or regulation than are ﬁrms without such market power.1 Under competition
law,a se x e m p l i ﬁed by Article 82 of the EC Treaty which prohibits the abuse of a dominant
position, dominant ﬁrms may be considerably limited in their freedom to set prices in response
to increased competition. For example, pricing policies adopted by dominant ﬁrms to meet rivals’
pressure in competitive segments, are only allowed insofar as they do not create exclusionary
eﬀects. This diﬀerent treatment of dominant ﬁrms can imply decisions such as banning speciﬁc
price discrimination practices. The European Commission has, for example, concluded that
oﬀering selective price cuts to a subset of customers can be regarded as abusive. These price
cuts do not have to constitute predatory pricing; selective price cuts above marginal costs may
also be regarded as abusive under EC competition law.2 Consider, for example, the case of Irish
Sugar, in which Irish Sugar granted special rebates to speciﬁc customers established in particular
county areas of the Irish Republic bordering with Northern Ireland, while it left prices in other
counties unchanged. These rebates were introduced to respond to the imports of cheaper retail
packets from Northern Ireland into certain border counties of the Irish Republic. The European
Commission concluded that the practice of selective price cutting was intended to protect the
dominant market position of Irish Sugar and therefore constituted an abuse of dominance. This
conclusion was upheld by the Courts.3 In another instance, British Gas charged prices to its
industrial customers, depending on their available alternatives (UK Monopolies and Mergers
Commission, 1988).4 Customers for whom it was diﬃcult to switch away from gas were charged
higher prices than were customers with dual-ﬁring equipment. Following an investigation by the
1Under EC competition law, a company in a dominant position has “a special responsibility not to allow its
conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition in the Common Market.” The dominant position referred to
in Article 82 of the Treaty refers to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables
it to prevent eﬀective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to
an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers, and ultimately of its consumers (taken from
United Brands, 1978).
2The European Commission, in a seminal decision upheld by the Courts, ﬁned AKZO for abusing its dominant
position by oﬀering selective predatory prices below average variable costs to customers of its smaller rival ECS.
Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, [1991] E.C.R. I-3359, [1993] 5 C.M.L.R. 215. See also Phlips
and Moras (1993) for an extensive description and a critical interpretation of the facts and the ﬁnal decision.
3For another case, see Compagnie Maritime Belge. See also Geradin and Petit (2006) for an extensive discussion
on price discrimination in the context of Article 82.
4See also Dixon and Easaw (2001).
2Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the freedom to price discriminate between these groups
of customers was removed. In another instance, the Swedish Competition Authority sued the
dominant operator TeliaSonera in 2005 because it “selectively oﬀered more favourable terms
to private customers who cancelled their ﬁxed-line telecom subscriptions and switched to a
competitor.”5
Moreover, in liberalised sectors such as telecommunications or electricity, incumbent (domi-
nant) ﬁrms often face ex ante regulatory restrictions (as opposed to ex post competition rules)
to compete with entrants in their attempts to “win back” customers that switched. These re-
strictions consist of prohibiting the incumbent operator from oﬀering lower prices selectively to
customers that moved their business relationship to a competitor, whilst at the same time main-
taining higher prices for their captive consumers. For example, in order to prevent incumbent
telephone or cable operators (like ILECs in the US) from engaging in such selective price-cutting
behaviour, the US Congress enacted a uniform rate requirement in 1992 in Section 623(d) of the
Communications Act, where “[A] cable operator shall have a rate structure, for the provision of
cable service, that is uniform throughout the geographic area in which cable service is provided
over its cable system.” Congress argued that the goal of Section 623(d) was “to prevent cable
operators from dropping the rates in one portion of a franchise area to undercut a competitor
temporarily.”6
These competition and regulatory cases illustrate that competition authorities and regulatory
bodies closely monitor and do not always favour behaviour-based price discrimination practices
of dominant ﬁrms involving selective price cutting or win-back strategies.7
5The Swedish Competition Authority sued Teliasonera because its “aim was to attract these customers back
to TeliaSonera’s ﬁxed-line telecom network by oﬀering them better terms than the company oﬀered its other
customers.” (http://www.kkv.se/t/NewsPage____1153.aspx)
6Outside the US, there have been several in-depth investigations by NRAs into win-back campaigns by incum-
bent telephone operators at the time of introduction of carrier (pre-) selection services. These have led to a number
of cases of prohibitions and measures to make selective price cutting impossible (or at least more diﬃcult). The
Canadian Regulatory Authority in 2002 prohibited eﬀorts by each local incumbent operator to win back clients
who had chosen carrier preselection, within a three-months period. See, for example, Decision CRTC 2006-69,
by the Canadian Radio Television and Telecommunications Commission, where this winback rule is explained (
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Decisions/2006/dt2006-69.htm) Similarly, the Spanish Commission for the
Telecommunications Market (the NRA) decided in 2003 that Telefonica had to refrain from taking actions to win
back any customer with carrier preselection from an alternative operator, until the expiration of a four-months
period (Bird&Bird, 2003).
7In May 2004, the London Stock Exchange launched Eurosets, a trading platform service in Dutch securities.
Euronext, the dominant market in Belgian, Dutch, French and Portuguese securities, responded by lowering its
fees for Dutch securities only. This selective price cut has led to close monitoring of Euronext behavior by the
3In this paper, we compare the competitive and welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent price discrimination
bans imposed on the dominant undertaking. To do so, we introduce a model where ﬁrms
compete for consumers during two periods. After the ﬁrst period, a price discrimination ban is
imposed on the dominant ﬁrm for the second period. This two-period set-up is appropriate given
the observation that ﬁrms often have pricing strategies that essentially contain intertemporal
aspects in competitive situations. In particular, when ﬁrms compete on a new market, they
often cannot initially judge consumers’ relative preferences. As a result, they charge uniform
prices in the beginning and may engage in selective price setting only later on. Similarly,
when an entrant becomes active on a competitive segment of the incumbent, neither player can
distinguish customers with a high preference for the incumbent from others until the entrant
has taken away some market share. In other words, before the incumbent can win back some
of its previous customers, a competing undertaking must lure away some of its customers, so an
intertemporal aspect inevitably appears.8 Our analysis shows that when ﬁrms and consumers
anticipate that a ban will constrain the dominant ﬁrm at a later stage, competitive eﬀects hinge
crucially on the type of price discrimination ban.
In our analysis, we study two price discrimination bans that produce opposing competitive
eﬀects. The ﬁrst pricing restriction is a ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”, which
forbids price discrimination by the dominant ﬁrm between the customers it served in the ﬁrst
p e r i o d . T h a ti s ,t h ed o m i n a n tﬁrm cannot charge a higher price in the second period to cus-
tomers the rivals cannot serve (the sheltered segment) relative to its ﬁrst-period customers in the
competitive segment. However, it can still charge a diﬀerent price in the competitive segment
to expand business and attract new customers in the second period. This pricing restriction
relates to British Gas where ex post intervention was mainly driven by the concern of the com-
petition authorities to protect the sheltered consumers from being overcharged. The second
restriction we consider is a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” and forbids price discrim-
ination within the competitive segment in the second period.9 This ban relates, for example, to
European Commission.
8In the Irish Sugar case, the dominant undertaking granted rebates only to customers that had switched away
to a competing undertaking, while loyal customers did not receive rebates. Paragraph 60 of the Commission
Decision97/624/ECof 14 May 1997 reads: “He [The managing Director of Irish Sugar’s Distributing Company]
went through the individual customers he [] had taken back and these amounted to [. . .] customers out of a
total of [. . .] that he has given it to. The other [. . .] are loyal ones who have always remained with him but
who were under pressure in the areas involved.”
9This ban reﬂects existing regulatory restrictions on win-back campaigns as in the 1992 US Communica-
tions Act mentioned above. Similarly, in the UK, Oftel announced that it would intervene promptly against
4ex ante regulations imposed on incumbents in the European telecom sector that prohibit them
from charging diﬀerent prices in the competitive segment.
By combining the two pricing restrictions — a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”
together with a ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”— a general price discrimination
ban or “uniform pricing obligation” results. It restrains the dominant ﬁrm from setting diﬀerent
prices both across the two segments and within the competitive segment. The uniform pricing
obligation relates to competition cases as described previously.
Our two-period analysis yields the following results. First, a ban on “higher-prices-to-
sheltered-consumers” reduces competition in the competitive segment as well as consumer wel-
fare and enhances the rival’s proﬁts. This ban harms the dominant ﬁrm when its proﬁts from
the sheltered segment are suﬃciently important. It increases the dominant ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period
market share while reducing its market share in the second period. By building up more ﬁrst-
period market share in the competitive segment, the dominant ﬁrm can maintain higher prices
on its sheltered segment in the second period. Although this ban increases consumer surplus in
the sheltered segment, consumer surplus decreases in the competitive segment. The reasoning is
that discounted average prices increase and fewer consumers are served by their most preferred
supplier.
Second, a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” relaxes second-period competition in
the competitive segment. Competition over both periods, however, is keener than when there
is complete pricing ﬂexibility as the ﬁrst-period demand becomes substantially more elastic.
The ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s- customers”, therefore, increases consumer welfare in the
competitive segment.
Third, a uniform pricing obligation reduces each ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the competitive segment
when the sheltered segment is small, but it enhances proﬁt when the size of the sheltered segment
is large. As a result, the importance of the sheltered segment determines the extent to which a
uniform pricing obligation inﬂuences consumer welfare.
Armstrong and Vickers (1993) consider the competitive and welfare eﬀects of a price dis-
crimination ban on the dominant ﬁrm.10 In their one-period model, the market consists of
British Telecom as soon as it started to set up win-back campaigns (see Bird&Bird, 2003). In 2004 Of-
com investigated a complaint by Tele2 that BT h a dm i s u s e di n f o r m a t i o np r o v i d e di nt h ec o n t e x to fi n t e r -
connection by approaching customers that had switched from BT to Tele2. Although Ofcom did not ﬁnd a
breach of information rules by BT, this case illustrates that Ofcom scrutinizes BT’s win-back strategies. See
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/bulletins/comp_bull_index/comp_bull_ccases/closed_all/cw_747/
10See also Vickers (2005).
5two segments. The ﬁrst is a sheltered segment, in which the dominant ﬁrm has a monopoly.
The dominant ﬁrm, however, competes in prices with a price-taking entrant on the remaining
competitive segment. They ﬁnd that a ban on price discrimination decreases the price in the
sheltered segment while, given entry, the price rises in the competitive segment. The reasoning
is that, with uniform pricing, the incumbent monopolist protects its sheltered segment and,
consequently, responds less aggressively to entry. Prices, however, may fall in both segments
when entry happens as the result of a price discrimination ban. While the welfare eﬀects from
banning price discrimination are ambiguous, an important result in their model is that a ban
on price discrimination generally results in entry on a larger scale.
We consider a two-period model in the spirit of Armstrong and Vickers (1993), with strategic
interaction in the competitive segment. In our model, the dominant ﬁrm charges the monopoly
price in its sheltered segment when it can set its prices unrestrainedly. In the competitive
segment, however, the incumbent ﬁrm and its rival compete with uniform prices in the ﬁrst
period and practice behaviour-based price discrimination in the second period, as in Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000). Without any imposed restriction on the prices charged, the dominant ﬁrm
optimally sets two diﬀerent prices in the ﬁrst period and three prices in the second period. As
ar e s u l t ,aq u a l i ﬁcation must be made as to how the incumbent’s freedom to set prices becomes
restricted following restraints imposed by, for example, a competition authority. Our model
distinguishes between diﬀerent pricing restrictions imposed on the dominant undertaking.
We emphasize that evaluations of price discrimination bans may heavily depend on the type
of the ban. Moreover, the results of a dynamic two-period model may lead to conclusions contrary
to those from a static one-period model. In particular, when there is a ban on “higher-prices-
to-sheltered-consumers”, discounted average prices in the competitive segment are higher. This
result is in line with Armstrong and Vickers (1993), who show that a ban on price discrimination
in a one-period model typically facilitates competitors in the competitive segment. However, our
two-period analysis shows that competition intensiﬁes when the dominant ﬁrm is restricted by
a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”, so that both ﬁrms obtain less proﬁt. In addition,
total (consumer) welfare increases with the ban as more consumers pay lower prices and are
served by their most preferred provider.
A closely related paper by Chen (2007) uses three variants of a dynamic model to study
behaviour-based price discrimination between competing asymmetric ﬁrms. In his model, an
incumbent has a monopoly position in the sheltered segment and competes in prices for con-
sumers with a more eﬃcient ﬁrm in the competitive segment. Firms can engage in behaviour-
6based price discrimination by observing consumers’ purchase history. Chen’s model shows that
uniform pricing weakens competition while it is suﬃcient for price discrimination to enhance
long-run consumer welfare when the more eﬃcient ﬁrm in the competitive segment does not
exit as a result of the incumbent’s pricing strategy. Our analysis and ﬁndings diﬀer in two
respects. First, our model considers a price discrimination ban for the dominant ﬁrm only, while
in Chen’s model a ban restricts both ﬁrms’ pricing strategies symmetrically. Second, we show
that a price discrimination ban on the dominant ﬁrm may intensify competition more than does
price discrimination. Since such an asymmetric ban on the dominant ﬁrm decreases the rival’s
proﬁts, it may enhance consumer welfare only when the rival ﬁrm remains in the market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and explains
the eﬀects of the two diﬀerent price discrimination bans imposed on the dominant ﬁrm. Section
3 presents a welfare analysis and provides a policy discussion. Section 4 concludes.
2 Modelling price discrimination bans on dominant ﬁrms
Consider two ﬁrms, A and B,t h a ta r ea c t i v eo nt h em a r k e td u r i n gt w op e r i o d s . T h ee n t i r e
market has mass 1 in each period, and consumers have inelastic and unit demand. Firm A
operates on two market segments. It is a monopolist in the sheltered segment which has mass a,
where 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. Absent any ban, ﬁrm A optimally charges the consumers’ willingness to pay
w on this sheltered segment in each period. The second segment is the competitive segment and
has mass 1−a.11 This competitive segment is modelled using a Hotelling framework where both
ﬁrms A and B are present.12 The consumers’ willingness to pay v is suﬃciently high to cover the
competitive segment. We assume that v<win the competitive segment to avoid the price in
the sheltered segment being lower than in the competitive segment. Consumers are distributed
uniformly with density 1−a on a line with unit length, and incur transportation costs t per unit
of distance. Consumers have ﬁxed preferences over time, and ﬁrms and consumers discount the
future at rate 0 ≤ δ<1.F i r m sA and B are located at opposing ends of the unit interval, with
A located at 0 and B at 1. The marginal costs for the two ﬁr m so nb o t hs e g m e n t sa r en o r m a l i z e d
to zero. The ﬁrms compete during two periods in the competitive segment. Absent any ban,
11As in Armstrong and Vickers (1993) and Chen (2007), both segments are considered to be part of the same
“relevant market”. For example, price-sensitive consumers belong to the competitive segment, while the price-
insensitive (loyal) consumers belong to the sheltered segment.
12We implicitly assume that B’s entry costs are suﬃciently low to ensure its presence. Later on, we will discuss
the eﬀects the diﬀerent bans might have on B’s decision to enter.
7the ﬁrms charge uniform prices in the ﬁrst period and have a dominant strategy to resort to
behaviour-based price discrimination in the second period (as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)).13
This modelling framework has two possible interpretations: the ﬁrst interpretation is that ﬁrm
A competes with ﬁrm B on a new but related market segment; the second interpretation is that
ﬁrm A had a former monopoly and ﬁrm B competes on, for example, the liberalized part of its
market. Both interpretations ﬁt our model.
We analyze two diﬀerent price discrimination bans that occur in practice. The ﬁrst is a ban
on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” as sometimes observed in competition law cases. The
second regards a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” as sometimes imposed by regulation.
To investigate the impact of each of these bans on welfare, we compare each ban to the benchmark
model where ﬁrms can set their prices in an unconstrained fashion.
It is important to note that our analysis concentrates only on cases where the dominant ﬁrm
(i) ﬁnds it proﬁtable to serve its sheltered segment and to be active in the competitive segment,
and (ii) has no interest in setting the same price in its sheltered segment as in the competitive
segment in the ﬁrst period. In other words, we limit the analysis to situations where the ban
restricts the dominant ﬁrm’s proﬁts. That is, the ﬁrm that serves the sheltered segment ﬁnds it
optimal to set a diﬀerent price in the competitive segment.
Another assumption we make is that the ﬁrm serving the sheltered segment ﬁnds it optimal
to remain or become dominant. We capture dominance by a total market share on the sheltered
and competitive segment of more than 50% in period one. A dominant ﬁrm can only be accused
of abusing its dominant position after a complaint has been received or after an independent
investigation by the competition authority. The ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”,
therefore, applies to the second period only, i.e., after dominance is veriﬁed by competition au-
thorities and abusive price discrimination has been observed.14 Therefore, ﬁrms and consumers
anticipate that the dominant ﬁrm will be accused of abusing its dominant position. Accordingly,
all the players will behave in each period as if the dominant ﬁrm will be restrained in the second
period by the ban. The “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” ban imposed by regulation prohibits
the dominant ﬁrm from using selective price cutting strategies to poach or win back the rival’s
customers in the competitive segment. All players anticipate that dominance will be observed
after period one. As a result, each ﬁrm optimally chooses its prices in both periods anticipating
13See also Armstrong (2006a,b), Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2005), and Stole (2005) for extensive overviews on
behaviour-based price discrimination.
14In the event the competition authority does not observe the price discrimination practice of the dominant
ﬁrm, rivals have proﬁti n c e n t i v e st om a k ec o m p l a i n t s .
8the prospect that the dominant ﬁrm will not be allowed to practice a win-back or poaching
strategy in the second period.
Our model analyzes the eﬀects when ﬁrm A allegedly abuses its dominant position after
the ﬁrst period so the price discrimination ban applies in the second period only. We analyze
the dynamic eﬀects of the diﬀerent bans as both ﬁrms and consumers anticipate that ﬁrm A
will face a speciﬁc ban in the second period so both ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-period pricing decisions will
reﬂect the anticipated ban on price discrimination in the second period. For convenience, we
will henceforth label ﬁrm A as the dominant ﬁrm. As the proofs of the propositions in this
section are straightforward, we incorporate them as much as possible into the text.
2.1 No Ban
Our analysis without ban allows complete pricing freedom for both ﬁrms. We consider the
sheltered and competitive segments separately as there are no price restrictions between these
two segments. Firm A is a monopolist in its sheltered segment and only faces competition in
the competitive segment.
Firm A charges a price w in its sheltered segment in both periods. Since it is optimal for A
to serve the entire sheltered segment, ﬁrm A’s total discounted proﬁts in the sheltered segment
(denoted by subscript s)e q u a l
ΠA
s = a(1 + δ)w.
Both ﬁrms A and B a r ea c t i v ei nt h ecompetitive segment. The analysis for this segment is
similar to that of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). To deal with second-period competition, assume
the ﬁrst-period competition results in ﬁrm A serving customers who are located “to the left
of x”a n dﬁrm B those “to the right of x”. As the dominant ﬁrm A does not face a ban
on selective price cutting, both ﬁrms will maximize their proﬁts by practicing behaviour-based
price discrimination in the second period. That is, both ﬁrms will charge diﬀerent prices to their
own ﬁrst-period customers and to the customers of the rival. Since both ﬁrms can identify the
customers positioned to the left and right of x, there are two indiﬀerent consumers. The ﬁrst
indiﬀerent consumer is at 0 ≤ α ≤ x and characterized by
pAA
2 + tα = pAB
2 + t(1 − α)
where pAA
2 and pAB
2 are A’s and B’s second-period prices (the right superscript), respectively,
charged to ﬁrm A’s ﬁrst-period consumers (the left superscript). The second indiﬀerent consumer
9is at x ≤ β ≤ 1 and satisﬁes
pBA
2 + tβ = pBB
2 + t(1 − β)
where pBA
2 and pBB
2 are A’s and B’s second-period prices, respectively, charged to B’s ﬁrst-period
consumers.
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The resulting second-period proﬁts in the competitive segment for ﬁrm i,w i t hi = A,B,a r e
Πi
2 =( 1− a)
5t(2x2 − 2x +1 )
9
.
We now turn to ﬁrst-period competition. The forward-looking ﬁrst-period indiﬀerent consumer
in the competitive segment is located at x such that
pA
1 + tx + δ[pAB
2 + t(1 − x)] = pB
1 + t(1 − x)+δ[pBA
2 + tx],
where δ reﬂects the discount rate, and pi
1 is ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst-period price, with i = A,B.T h e
indiﬀerent consumer anticipates that if he visits ﬁrm i in the ﬁrst period, it will be optimal for
him to visit the other ﬁrm in the second period in order to beneﬁt from its poaching price. After
substitution of both ﬁrms’ second-period prices, one obtains ﬁrm A’s ﬁrst-period market share
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15We will consider only the internal solution, wherefrom the ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient.
In other words, x should not be too large. In particular, x ≤ 3/4. See Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) for an
extensive analysis on the conditions for an interior solution.
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The discounted proﬁts for both ﬁrms in the competitive segment amount to
Πi




In equilibrium, both ﬁrms symmetrcially serve half of the competitive segment, or x =1 /2,a n d
enjoy identical proﬁts in that segment. In the second period, one third of the consumers in the
competitive segment switch supplier since α =1 /3 and β =2 /3.
The ﬁrms’ total discounted proﬁts on the entire market are the combined results from the
competitive and sheltered segments:
ΠA = a(1 + δ)w +( 1− a)
t(8δ +9 )
18




It is clear that A generates greater proﬁts than does B as it enjoys a monopoly position in its
sheltered segment. Firm A serves its sheltered segment and half of the competitive segment.
Therefore its total market share becomes a +0 .5(1 − a).T h eﬁrms’ total market share remain
identical in the ﬁrst and second period even though they do not serve the same set of consumers.
2.2 Ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”
In this section the dominant ﬁrm A faces a ban in the second period and is no longer allowed to
charge higher prices to its sheltered consumers in this period. This ban implies that A has to set
an identical second-period price to all of its ﬁrst-period consumers across the two segments.T h a t
is, ﬁrm A charges a second-period price p0AA
2 to its ﬁrst-period customers from both the sheltered
and the competitive segments, where the “ 0 ” superscript indicates the ban on “higher-prices-to-
sheltered-consumers”. Therefore, ﬁrm A can no longer treat its sheltered segment independently
11of the competitive segment in the second period. The ban still allows ﬁrm A to poach B’s ﬁrst-
period customers by means of a diﬀerent price in the competitive segment. Thus, our modelling
approach implies that the ban only becomes eﬀective in the second period. In other words, after
the ﬁrm has become dominant in the ﬁrst period. Firm B, in contrast, is not restricted in its
price-setting behaviour in any period. Moreover, it is a dominant strategy for ﬁrm B to practice
price discrimination in the second period. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the eﬀects of the ban on
market shares and prices in both periods.
Firm A’s sheltered segment is served at a price w in the ﬁrst period. The ban implies,
however, that A c a no n l yc h a r g ep0AA
2 <v<win the second period.16
Consider the competitive segment. Suppose ﬁrst-period competition results in ﬁrm A serving
consumers to the left of x0. There are two indiﬀerent consumers in the second period. The ﬁrst
indiﬀerent consumer is at 0 ≤ α0 ≤ x0 and characterized by
p0AA
2 + tα0 = p0AB
2 + t(1 − α0)
where p0AA
2 and p0AB
2 is A’s and B’s second-period price, respectively, charged to consumers who
purchased from A in the ﬁrst period. It is crucial to point out that p0AA
2 is also charged in A’s
sheltered segment. The other indiﬀerent consumer is at x0 ≤ β0 ≤ 1 and satisﬁes
p0BA
2 + tβ0 = p0BB
2 + t(1 − β0)
where p0BA
2 and p0BB
2 is A’s and B’s second-period price, respectively, charged to consumers who
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The equilibrium prices that result are
p0AA
2 =















16We implicitly impose two assumptions on ﬁrm A’s behaviour. The ﬁrst is that ﬁrm A will ﬁnd it optimal to
lower its price in the sheltered segment when the ban applies. This seems reasonable since otherwise the sheltered
segment would have a lower price than the competitive segment without the ban. Second, we assume that ﬁrm
A ﬁnds it optimal to be active in the competitive segment when the ban applies. This will happen as long as a
is not too large and/or consumers’ willingness to pay in the sheltered segment is not too high.
12for ﬁrm A and B, respectively.
We now turn to ﬁrst-period competition. The ﬁrst-period indiﬀerent consumer anticipates
that when buying from ﬁrm A in the ﬁrst period and paying a price p0A
1 he will receive a poaching
price p0AB
2 in the second period from ﬁrm B.B y b u y i n g f r o m ﬁrm B in the ﬁrst period and
paying p0B
1 , the indiﬀerent consumer anticipates he will pay a price p0BA
2 that is charged by ﬁrm
A to new customers. Formally,
p0A
1 + tx0 + δ[p0AB
2 + t(1 − x0)] = p0B
1 + t(1 − x0)+δ[p0BA
2 + tx0]




1 − t(δ +1 ) )+t(δ +3 )− 3(p0A
1 − p0B
1 )
2t(1 − a)(δ +3 )
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are the ﬁrst-period prices for ﬁrm A and B, respectively. As can be veriﬁed, both ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-
period prices are always positive. Firm A’s price is higher without the ban, whereas the opposite







2(1 − a)(27 − 11δ)
,
which is greater than 0.5. Firm A’s second-period market share on the competitive segment
entails





2(1 − a)(27 − 11δ)
,
a n di sl e s st h a n0 . 5 . F i r mA’s total market share in both segments, therefore, decreases over
the two periods. The average market share over the two periods in the competitive segment is
less than 0.5, which suggests that the ban reduces ﬁrm A’s dominance as measured by market
share.
Several observations are worth mentioning. The ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”
leads to ﬁrms charging diﬀerent ﬁrst-period prices. The dominant ﬁrm A sets lower prices than
does ﬁrm B. The reasoning stems from two forces. First, the indiﬀerent consumer anticipates ag-
gressive second-period poaching by ﬁrm A when opting for ﬁrm B in the ﬁrst period as x0 > 0.5.
13Second, opting for ﬁrm A in the ﬁrst period leads to less aggressive second-period poaching by
ﬁrm B because x0 > 0.5.













































The equilibrium proﬁts realized by both ﬁrms on the entire market are








82δ2 − 198δ + 243
¢
+ 352δ2 − 1953δ + 2673
¤
9(1 − a)(27− 11δ)
2 (1)








182δ2 − 648δ + 243
¢
− 253δ + 9(113δ − 108)
¤
9(1 − a)(27− 11δ)
2 .
The impact of the ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” as compared to the scenario
where the dominant ﬁrm A can price discriminate between its ﬁrst-period customers can be
summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Compare the ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” to the no-ban
case. A ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” increases the rival’s overall proﬁts. It
harms the dominant ﬁrm when its proﬁts in the sheltered segment are substantial. The ban
increases the dominant ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period market share but reduces its second-period market
share.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate Proposition 1. Both ﬁgures graphically outline the main price
diﬀerences between the no-ban case and a ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” for the
ﬁrst and the second period, respectively.
Three remarks are appropriate here. First, a proﬁtc o m p a r i s o nshows that the dominant
ﬁrm A prefers complete ﬂexibility when w ≥ ¯ w where ¯ w satisﬁes ΠA − Π
0A =0 . Although
the ban reduces the dominant ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the sheltered segment, it also reduces the rival’s
aggressiveness and suﬃciently increases the dominant ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the competitive segment.
However, when w<¯ w its proﬁts increase. The dominant ﬁrm then prefers to have its hands
tied by this particular ban and to set a uniform price for all its ﬁrst-period customers. Firm
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Fig. 2 ‘Higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers’ ban: second period costs, this would encourage B’s decision to enter the competitive segment. In other words, the
ban makes the dominant ﬁrm less aggressive, which results in greater proﬁts for ﬁrm B.
Second, the ban also produces interesting diﬀerential intertemporal eﬀects. The ban on
“higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” relaxes second-period competition in A’s ﬁrst-period com-
petitive segment. This result stems from two forces. First, ﬁrm A becomes less aggressive as
the ban implies that it sets an identical price for all its ﬁrst-period customers. Second, x0 is
greater than 0.5, thus softening ﬁrm B’s reaction. In contrast, second-period competition on B’s
ﬁrst-period market becomes more intense. The reasoning is that x0 is greater than 0.5,w h i c h
implies a more aggressive poaching price by ﬁrm A. First-period competition with a ban com-
pared to no ban leads to lower prices by the dominant ﬁrm and higher prices by the rival ﬁrm.
The reasoning stems from two forces. On the one hand, ﬁrm A wants to build up ﬁrst-period
market share as the ban implies higher second-period prices for those customers. On the other
hand, forward-looking consumers anticipate less aggressive second-period poaching by ﬁrm B
and more aggressive poaching by ﬁrm A. This decreases consumer price sensitivity and gives the
marginal consumer a preference for B at equal ﬁrst-period prices.
Finally, anticipation of a ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” increases the domi-
nant ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period market share. That is, in addition to the sheltered segment, the dominant
ﬁrm serves more than half of the competitive segment in the ﬁrst period.
2.3 Ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”
In this section we assume that the dominant ﬁrm A is no longer allowed to set lower prices to
its rival’s customers. With such a ban, dominant ﬁrm A cannot cut prices selectively within the
competitive segment.F i r mA, however, can charge diﬀerent prices across the sheltered segment
and the competitive segment. Firm B does not face a ban and ﬁnds it proﬁtable to engage in
price discrimination. Technically, this implies that ﬁrm A is restricted to charge a single price
p00A
2 to the rival’s ﬁrst-period customers and its own ﬁrst-period customers in the competitive
segment, while ﬁrm B can charge the discriminating prices p00BB
2 and p00AB
2 .T h e“ 00 ” superscript
denotes the ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the eﬀects of
this ban on the market shares and the prices in both periods.
It should be clear that the sheltered segment can be treated independently from the compet-
itive segment. Firm A optimally charges w in both periods such that its discounted proﬁts in
the sheltered segment become
15Π00A
s = a(1 + δ)w.
Suppose ﬁrst-period competition in the competitive segment leads to ﬁrm A serving consumers
to the left of x00.T h eﬁrst indiﬀerent consumer is located at α00 such that
p00A
2 + tα00 = p00AB
2 + t(1 − α00)
while the second indiﬀerent consumer located at β00 is characterized by
p00A
2 + tβ00 = p00BB
2 + t(1 − β00).
Firm A maximizes its second-period proﬁts in the competitive segment
Π00A
2c (p00A
2 )=( 1− a)p00A
2
£
α00 + β00 − x00¤




2 )=( 1− a)
£
p00BB
2 (1 − β00)+p00AB
2 (x00 − α00)
¤
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We now turn to ﬁrst-period competition. The forward-looking ﬁrst-period indiﬀerent consumer
in the competitive segment is located at x00 such that
p00A
1 + tx00 + δ[p00AB
2 + t(1 − x00)] = p00B
1 + t(1 − x00)+δ[p00A
2 + tx00].
Note that the marginal consumer opting for ﬁrm B in the ﬁrst period expects to be poached by
ﬁrm A at a price p00A
2 “only”. This price is relatively high as it is identical to the price charged by
A to its ﬁrst-period customers in the competitive segment. In visiting ﬁrm A in the ﬁrst-period,
the indiﬀerent consumer anticipates a more attractive second-period poaching price by ﬁrm B.
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The discounted proﬁts for both ﬁrms in the competitive segment amount to
Π00A








In equilibrium, both ﬁrms serve half of the competitive segment, or x00 =0 .5, but their proﬁts
diﬀer. Firm A enjoys greater proﬁts than ﬁrm B even though it faces a ban. The reasoning is
that the ban allows ﬁrm A to commit not to price discriminate within the competitive segment.
In the second period, one fourth of the consumers in the competitive segment switch supplier
since α00 =3 /8 and β00 =5 /8.
The ﬁrms’ total discounted proﬁts on the entire market are obtained by adding up the results
in the competitive and sheltered segments, rersulting in
Π00A = a(1 + δ)w +( 1− a)
t(5δ + 12)
24




Obviously, the dominant ﬁrm A generates greater proﬁts than does B. The reasoning is that (i)
that it enjoys a monopoly position in its sheltered segment and (ii) that it obtains higher proﬁts
in the competitive segment. Firm A serves its sheltered segment and half of the competitive
segment such that its total market share becomes a +0 .5(1 − a).F i r mA’s total market share
remains identical over the two periods although it does not serve the same consumers in every
period.
We address the impact of the ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” by making a com-
parison with the outcome where the dominant ﬁrm A can charge discriminatory prices in the
competitive segment. Proposition 2 summarizes the main insights that follow from our analysis.
Proposition 2. Compare the ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” to the no-ban case.
A ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” harms the dominant ﬁrm’s overall proﬁts. This ban
17also lowers rival’s overall proﬁts. The dominant ﬁrm’s market share in the competitive segment
remains unaﬀected.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate Proposition 2. Both ﬁgures graphically outline the main price
diﬀerences between the no-ban case and a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” for the
ﬁrst and the second period, respectively.
The ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” leads to keener competition as both ﬁrms’
proﬁts are unambiguously lower when the ban applies. This ﬁnding is entirely determined by
the competitive segment as the ban leaves ﬁrm A’s proﬁts in the sheltered segment unaﬀected.
In the second period, ﬁrm A’s proﬁts decrease from 5t/18 without ban to t/4 while ﬁrm B’s
proﬁts increase to 5t/16.17 First-period demand, however, becomes much more elastic as a result
of the ban. To see this, we compare the price sensitivity of the marginal consumer in the static
model to this two-period model. Given the second-period prices as expressed in (2) and the
price p00B
1 charged by ﬁrm B in the ﬁrst period, suppose that ﬁrm A changes its ﬁrst-period
price slightly to p00A
1 −  . The marginal consumer is now located at x00 =0 .5+γ,w h e r eγ
measures the marginal consumer’s sensitivity to this price change. From Eq. (3), γ satisﬁes
p00A
1 − ε + t(0.5+γ)+δ(
t(5(0.5+γ) − 1)
6
+ t(0.5 − γ)) =
p00B









Clearly, when ε =0it follows that γ =0 . Put diﬀerently, although the equilibrium ﬁrst-period
prices diﬀer, both ﬁrms equally share the competitive segment. However, when ε 6=0 ,af o r w a r d -
looking consumer reacts much more sensitively to a price change as opposed to the static model
where δ =0and γ = ε/2t. This is because the second-period poaching price of the other ﬁrm
goes up by less than one unit when the dominant ﬁrm decreases its ﬁrst-period price by one
unit, as can be seen from (2).18 This explains why both ﬁrms charge more competitive prices
17See also Armstrong (2006a), Sections 3.4 and 5.1.
18In Fudenberg and Tirole’s (2000) model, the opposite holds. Armstrong (2006a) shows that γ = ε/(2t(1+δ/3))
so that the marginal consumer is less sensitive to a ﬁrst-period price change than with the static model: a ﬁrst-
period price cut of one unit by ﬁrm A beneﬁts the marginal consumer’s current utility but is harmful in the next
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Fig. 3 ‘Lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers’ ban: first period 
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Fig. 4 ‘Lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers’ ban: second period in the ﬁrst period as compared to the static model.
It is interesting to observe that the ban generates a diﬀerential impact on second-period
pricing of both ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-period customers. The second-period competition for ﬁrm A’s ﬁrst-
period customers is more pronounced when the ban applies. The reasoning is that ﬁrm A’s
pricing becomes more aggressive as it can charge only one price to keep ﬁrst-period customers
and poach ﬁrm B’s ﬁrst-period customers. In contrast, second-period competition for B’s ﬁrst-
p e r i o dc u s t o m e r si sr e l a x e d . T h i se x p l a i n sw h yi ti so p t i m a lf o rﬁrm B to charge ﬁrst-period
prices that are les than ﬁrm A’s.
Therefore, a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” lowers all ﬁrms’ discounted proﬁts
and as such disfavors entry when anticipated.
3 Welfare Analysis, Discussion, and Policy Implications
Welfare Analysis. We now provide a welfare analysis of the bans on “higher-prices-to-
sheltered-consumers” and “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”. We compare each of the bans
to the no-ban setting. Our ﬁndings are presented in Propositions 3 and 4.
Proposition 3. The ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” increases the consumer
surplus in the sheltered segment. In the competitive segment, the ban (i) reduces the consumer
surplus and increases the producer surplus, and (ii) decreases the total welfare as fewer consumers
are served by their most preferred provider.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
P r o p o s i t i o n3s h o w st h a tab a no n“ h i g h e r - p r i c e s -to-sheltered-consumers” generates redis-
tributive eﬀects. It favours sheltered consumers by introducing competition by means of a
price-discrimination ban. This introduction, however, is at the expense of consumers in the
competitive segment where competition decreases. Moreover, the discounted average prices are
higher across the two periods so that proﬁts increase. Finally, fewer consumers are served by
their nearest provider.
Proposition 4. The ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” does not aﬀect the social
welfare in the sheltered segment. In the competitive segment, however, the ban (i) increases the
consumer surplus but reduces the producer surplus, and (ii) increases the total welfare as more
consumers are served by their most preferred provider.
19Proof: See Appendix 2.
Proposition 4 shows that the ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” provides greater
total welfare and consumer welfare. This result stems from two complementary forces. First,
the ban improves the second-period allocation of consumers as fewer consumers visit their non-
nearby provider. Second, overall competition with a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”
is greater than without a ban.
Discussion. We start our discussion by highlighting the intertemporal eﬀects of each ban.
We point out how incorporating the expectation of a ban into the ﬁrms’ strategies may reverse
some of the static one-period ﬁndings and even lead to unintended results. Then we turn to a
comparison of the implications of the diﬀerent bans. Third, we present the results of a ban that
would impose a uniform pricing obligation on the dominant ﬁrm; a ban that combines the ban
on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” and on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”.
First, let us consider the intertemporal eﬀects of the ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-
consumers”. Recall that this ban lowers prices in the sheltered segment and so protects sheltered
consumers. However, this protection comes at the cost of relaxing overall competition in the
competitive segment. Therefore, the ban facilitates the rivals if the entry costs are ﬁxed. The
lower degree of rivalry in the competitive segment, however, also exhibits interesting dynamic
and redistributional eﬀects (see Figures 1 and 2) compared to the no-ban benchmark. Firm
A’s ﬁrst-period consumers beneﬁtf r o ml o w e rﬁrst-period prices while ﬁrm B’s consumers pay
higher ﬁrst-period prices. The opposite happens in the second period as ﬁrm B’s ﬁrst-period
customers enjoy lower prices while ﬁrm A’s ﬁrst-period customers are harmed.
Our analysis has thus far assumed that ﬁrms and consumers rationally anticipate the ban
on “higer-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”. Consider now how our second-period ﬁndings would
be modiﬁed when ﬁrms would not be able to behave strategically from period one to the next.
A ﬁrst implication is that, without anticipation, there are no intertemporal linkages or dynamic
eﬀects between the two periods. To see this, suppose that the market would have been equally
divided in the ﬁrst period or x0 =0 .5. This assumption allows us to identify the marginal eﬀects
that anticipation generates on second-period outcomes, as deviations from x0 =0 .5 in our setting
stem from ﬁrst-period strategic behavior. To understand the marginal eﬀects, it should be clear
that any deviation of x0 from 0.5 produces opposing eﬀects in A’s (the “left”) and B’s (the
“right”) segments. In particular, when x0 > 0.5, competition increases in the “right” segment
but relaxes in the “left” segment. The reasoning is that a rival’s poaching strategy increases
20in its own ﬁrst-period market share in the competitive segment. Anticipation of the ban on
“higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”, however, gives the dominant ﬁrm incentives to build-up
ﬁrst-period market share to protect its sheltered segment from future competition. As a result,
it charges low prices in the ﬁrst period, which leads to more relax second-period competition
in A’s hinterland. However, sharper second-period competition in B’s hinterland takes place.
Consequently, ﬁrm A’s ﬁrst-period market share endogenously increases as a result of the ban
on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”. Therefore, although the ban decreases A’s proﬁts,
the interemporal eﬀects lead to higher ﬁrst-period market shares for the dominant ﬁrm, which
partly undermines the ban’s goal.
Second, consider the ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”. Typically, the motivation
by regulators to introduce this ban has been to encourage entry and by competition authorities
to enable entry and/or to prevent exit of at least as eﬃcient competitors. Our analysis shows
that this ban leaves the sheltered segment unaﬀected, but leads to more intense competition in
the competitive segment. Therefore, a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” would result
in more diﬃcult entry when entry costs are no longer covered by the decrease in proﬁts. This
suggests that the ban would miss its intended purpose.19 How can these ﬁndings be reconciled?
First, when we consider second-period competition only, the ban intensiﬁes competition in A’s
hinterland but relaxes competition in B’s hinterland. The reasoning is that A’s price now is set
both to serve its hinterland (its strong market segment) and to poach its rival’s customers (its
weak market segment). This ban decreases A’s price in its strong market segment, and increases
A’s price in its weak market segment. These second-period results are identical to those derived
from a static analysis where only second-period competition would be considered since x00 =0 .5.
Thus, a ban on “lower-prices-ro-rival’s customers” does indeed facilitate entry as compared to
no ban when applying only a static (second-period) analysis. This second-period result is in line
with Thisse and Vives (1988) who analyze oligopolistic price discrimination with asymmetric
best-responses in a static framework.20 They also ﬁnd that competition decreases when one ﬁrm
19Relatedly, our model assumes that with a ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”, the dominant ﬁrm
maximizes its proﬁts by choosing to be present in the competitive segment. Chen (2007) also considers the opposite
case where the dominant ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to serve the sheltered segment only with a price discrimination
ban. This leaves its rival with a monopoly on the competitive segment. A ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-
consumers” then results in a monopoly on both segments. Clearly, such a ban harms consumer welfare and may
miss its intented purpose.
20Corts (1998) introduces the notion of asymmetric best-responses, where one ﬁrm’s weak market is the other
ﬁrm’s strong market and vice versa. In such a setting, price discrimination may result in lower proﬁts for all
ﬁr m sa sc o m p a r e dt ot h ee q u i l i b r i u mp r o ﬁts under uniform pricing. See also Bester and Petrakis (1996) for a
21is forbidden to price discriminate. Second, when we take into account the ﬁrst-period eﬀects,
however, the results revese. Recall that anticipation of the ban does not modify second-period
competition when competition takes place in the ﬁrst period. However, ﬁrst-period competition
itself incorporates the presence of a ban in the second period. Indeed, ﬁrst-period demand with
a ban on “lower-prices-ro-rival’s-customers” is much more elastic than without a ban. This
increased price sensitivity leads to keener ﬁrst-period competition. Summing up, we can state
that ﬁrm B’s total proﬁts are lower because this ﬁrst-period pro-competitive eﬀect outweighs
the increased second-period proﬁts realized in B’s hinterland.
Third, consider a uniform pricing obligation on the dominant ﬁrm. This general ban on
price discrimination is a combination of both bans discussed in the main text and is worked
out in Appendix 1. In the second period, the dominant ﬁrm is obliged to charge a uniform
price within the competitive segment and across both segments. As with the ban on “higher-
prices-to-sheltered-consumers”, the competition or regulatory authority needs the ﬁrst period
to observe the dominant ﬁrm’s behaviour and to establish dominance before it can intervene in
the second period. The dominant ﬁrm, its rival and the consumers in the competitive segment
all anticipate this uniform pricing obligation and behave accordingly in the ﬁrst period. The
results hinge on the size of the sheltered segment. Consider ﬁrst a small-sized sheltered segment
(low a). Intuitively, this ban then comes close to the ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”
as the sheltered segment is relatively unimportant. The ban then leads to lower second-period
prices in A’s hinterland and sheltered segment. Therefore, sheltered consumers strongly beneﬁt
from such a ban. In contrast, second-period prices increase in B’s hinterland. Without dynamic
eﬀects (i.e. when e x =0 .5), the latter increase would even become larger. Therefore, with a
static analysis the ban achieves its two goals — protecting sheltered consumers and enhancing
entry. The ﬁrst-period competition, however, is much sharper than without a ban. This keener
ﬁrst-period competition dominates, generating overall lower proﬁts for ﬁrm B. Therefore, for
low a, our dynamic model shows that the ban does not ease entry. Second, consider a larger-sized
sheltered segment (high a). Intuitively, in this case, the main forces are similar to those of a
ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”. Firm B’s proﬁts are higher compared to the no-
ban case. Therefore, this ban does, indeed, facilitate and protect entry. The goal of protecting
sheltered consumers is still met but to a lesser extent. With a large sheltered segment, all second-
period prices increase compared to the no-ban scenario. This implies that ﬁrm B’s second-period
proﬁts increase due to the ban. This increase can be decomposed into two components. First,
one-period duopoly model where price discrimination decreases every ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
22ﬁrm B’s proﬁts are also higher when applying a static analysis only (i.e. e x =0 .5). Second, the
dynamic eﬀects through a e x>0.5 stimulate ﬁrm B’s proﬁts even further. Also, all ﬁrst-period
prices are higher than without a ban.
Policy implications. As far as the policy implications are concerned, the key question is
whether or not competition policy should ban “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” and/or
ban “lower-prices-to- rival’s customers”. The answer to this question depends, amongst other
things, on the policy objectives. Does competition policy take consumer surplus or total surplus
as its assessment standard? Does competition policy have an explicit redistributive purpose. For
example, should sheltered consumers be protected at the cost of consumers at the competitive
segment?21
If the objective of competition policy is (1) to optimize consumer surplus; and (2) not
to redistribute surplus between groups of consumers, then the ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-
customers” serves to meet this objective. Whether or not a ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-
consumers” should be imposed is ambiguous and depends on the relative consumer surplus
changes due to the ban in the sheltered and competitive segments.
Another point that is relevant for competition policy is that a static analysis is not appro-
priate for assessing competitive practices that essentially exhibit intertemporal features. In our
model, from a static point of view, a ban on price discrimination encourages entry. From a
dynamic perspective, however, our paper shows that this is not necessarily the case. The ban
on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers” does, indeed, encourage entry. The ban on “lower-
prices-to-rival’s-customers”, on the contrary, may have an exclusionary eﬀe c ta si td i s c o u r a g e s
entry by reducing entrants’ proﬁts.
A ﬁnal related point is that prohibiting certain business practices by dominant ﬁrms can have
various eﬀects that ideally should all be taken into account. For example, the ban on “lower-
prices-to-rival’s-customers” is exclusionary in the sense that it discourages entry. However, it
reduces at the same time “exploitative” damage due to above-marginal-cost pricing, because it
intensiﬁes competition. Policy discussions on the legality or illegality of certain practices should
take all these eﬀects into account and be presented as trade-oﬀs.
There is much debate on both sides of the Atlantic whether or not selective price cuts above
marginal cost can enhance consumer surplus. Following the Brooke and American Airlines cases
in the US, it looks as though the current US position is that selective price cuts above marginal
21See Farrell and Katz (2006) for a discussion of these and related issues.
23cost in response to competitive threats should be allowed. Consequently, the ban on “lower-
prices-to-rival’s-customers” is not enforced under US antitrust policy even though it would lead
to higher consumer surplus. Under EC competition policy, this form of selective price cuts may
be prohibited (see e.g. Compagnie Maritime Belge).
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In his call for a stronger economic basis for the response to the abuse of market power, Vickers
(2005) observes that “the natural and mostly desirable response to competition by dominant
ﬁrms will often involve (above-cost) price discrimination. This suggests that hostility to this
form of response to competition would be wrong, but that in limited economic circumstances
the evidence as a whole might justify a ﬁnding of abuse... Which circumstances is a matter in
need of more economic analysis”.22 Our paper aims to contribute to the response to this call by
studying the eﬀects on competition of prohibiting above marginal cost price discrimination by
a dominant ﬁrm.
In particular, we study the competitive and welfare eﬀects of two bans on price discrimina-
tion, when ﬁrms and consumers strategically anticipate that such bans will be imposed on the
dominant ﬁrm. We analyze these bans using a two-period model where the market exhibits a
competitive and a sheltered segment. The ﬁrst ban prohibits the dominant ﬁrm from charging
higher prices to its sheltered consumers. This ban decreases competition in the competitive
segment and increases the initial market share of the dominant ﬁrm. Furthermore, this ban has
a redistributive eﬀect on welfare: while consumer surplus in the sheltered segment increases, the
sum of the consumer and the producer surplus decreases in the competitive segment.
The second pricing restriction is a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”, which would
be motivated by prohibitions of win-back campaigns. While competition policy authorities have
designed this ban to protect competitors and stimulate entry, we show that this ban leads to
more intense competition. This result shows that a dynamic approach is the key for taking
all eﬀects into account, as a static one-period analysis shows that competition relaxes in the
competitive segment.
22See Vickers (2005), page F257.
245A p p e n d i x
Appendix 1: Uniform pricing obligation A general ban on price discrimination implies
that ﬁrm A can neither price discriminate neither across its sheltered segment and the com-
petitive segment nor within the competitive segment. Therefore ﬁrm A faces a uniform pricing
obligation in the second period. It is clear that such an obligation introduces a link between the
sheltered segment and the competitive segment.
Firm A optimally serves its sheltered segment at price w in the ﬁrst period. The ban implies
however that ﬁrm A sets a price e pA
2 <wfor all its second-period customers, including the
sheltered segment. The “e ” on top of the symbol denotes this general ban or the uniform
pricing obligation.
Consider the competitive segment. Suppose ﬁrst-period competition leads to ﬁrm A serving
consumers to the left of e x,w h e r e f r o mB served consumers to the right of e x. In the second period,
there are two indiﬀerent consumers. The ﬁrst is located at 0 ≤ e α ≤ e x and is characterized by
e pA
2 + te α = e pAB
2 + t(1 − e α)
while the second indiﬀerent consumer located at e β is characterized by
e pA
2 + te β = e pBB
2 + t(1 − e β).






a +( 1− a)
³
e α + e β − e x
´i
and ﬁrm B maximizes
e ΠB
2 (e pBB
2 , e pAB
2 )=( 1− a)
h
e pBB
2 (1 − e β)+e pAB
2 (e x − e α)
i
.
The ﬁrst-order conditions result in
e pA
2 =








t(5 − e x(1 − a) − 3a)
6(1− a)
.
Second-period prices depend on a as this general ban implies uniform pricing between the shel-
tered and the competitive segment for ﬁrm A.W h e na =0 , observe that the model coincides
with the ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”.
25We now turn to ﬁrst-period competition. The forward-looking ﬁrst-period indiﬀerent con-
sumer in the competitive segment is located at e x such that
e pA
1 + te x + δ[e pAB
2 + t(1 − e x)] = e pB
1 + t(1 − e x)+δ[e pA
2 + te x].
Note that the indiﬀerent consumer opting for ﬁrm B expects to be poached by ﬁrm A at a price
e pA
2 “only”. This price is not very aggressive as it is identical to the price charged by A to its
ﬁrst-period customers in both the competitive and the sheltered segments. In visiting ﬁrm A in
the ﬁrst-period, the indiﬀerent consumer anticipates a more attractive second-period poaching
price by ﬁrm B. After substitution of both ﬁrms’ second-period prices, one obtains ﬁrm A’s
ﬁrst-period market share on the competitive segment:
e x =
6(e pB
1 − e pA
1 )+t(6 − δ) − a
¡
2(e pA
1 − e pB
1 )+3 t(δ − 2)
¢
t(12 − 5δ)(1− a)
.
Firm A maximizes the following total discounted proﬁti nb o t hs e g m e n t s
e ΠA(e pA
1 , e pB
1 )=aw +( 1− a) e pA
1 e x + δe pA
2
h




e β − e x
´´i
whereas ﬁrm B maximizes
e ΠB(e pB
1 , e pA
1 )=( 1− a)
h
e pB
1 (1 − e x)+δ
h
e pBB
2 (1 − e β)+e pAB
2 (e x − e α)
ii
.













2atδ (15 − 8δ)
3(1− a)(54− 31δ)
.
Competition with a uniform pricing obligation leads to diﬀerent ﬁrst-period prices charged
by both ﬁrms. Dominant ﬁrm A’s prices outweigh its rival’s as e pA
1 > e pB
1 . The reasoning stems
from the anticipated second-period poaching behavior by both ﬁrms. Similar to their reaction
to the ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”, consumers anticipate that the poaching price
of the dominant ﬁrm A will be less aggressive than that of rival ﬁrm B. However, this force is
now even stronger as the poaching aggressiveness of dominant ﬁrm A decreases in a.






2(1 − a)(54 − 31δ)
,
26which is greater than 0.5. Consequently, ﬁrm A’s second-period market share in the competitive
segment entails





2(1 − a)(54 − 31δ)
,
and is less than 0.5. Firm A’s total market share in both segments, therefore, decreases from
period one to period two, showing that the ban increases the initial dominance but reduces ﬁrm
A’s dominance over time.





























Discounted proﬁts for both ﬁr m so nb o t hs e g m e n t sa m o u n tt o
e ΠA = aw +( 1− a)























569δ2 − 1983δ + 1728
¢
− 4681δ2 + 6(2723δ − 2376)
¤
12(1 − a)(54− 31δ)
2 .
We will now compare the uniform pricing obligation of the dominant ﬁrm with our no-ban
scenario. Recall that, when a =0 ,t h eb a ne ﬀectively becomes identical to a ban to “lower-
prices-to-rival’s-customers”. In that case, prices are lower in the ﬁrst period and in ﬁrm B’s
ﬁrst-period segment. Second-period prices in ﬁrm A’s ﬁrst-period segment are higher compared
to the no-ban scenario. Overall competition is keener compared to the base case, which implies
that such a ban discourages entry. All prices in the competitive segment increase in a,w h i c h
indicates that the results on the intensity of competition and the price levels hinge on the size
of the sheltered segment a. For a low enough a, overall competition will still be keener than in
the no-ban case, making the ban entry deterring. For a high enough a, however, competition
will be less severe so the rival ﬁrm’s proﬁts are higher than in the no-ban case. That is, ﬁrm
B enjoys higher overall proﬁts than under the no-ban case when the ban suﬃciently lowers the
aggressiveness of the dominant ﬁrm A. The ban also produces interesting intertemporal eﬀects.
Anticipation of this uniform pricing obligation for the dominant ﬁrm leads to larger ﬁrst-period
market shares: the dominant ﬁrm serves more than half of the competitive segment in addition
to its sheltered segment. Second-period dominance becomes less important as e x<0.5.
27A p p e n d i x2 P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : The ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”
reduces the prices in the sheltered segment, which imples that consumer welfare in the sheltered
segment increases. We ﬁrst consider the competitive segment.
(i) Consumer Surplus. We ﬁr s td i s p l a yt h ec o n s u m e r s ’ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial expendi-
tures in the competitive segment without ban. The sum of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial outlays
equals
t(1 − a)(43δ +4 5 )
36
. (4)

























The ﬁrst term at the RHS of the above expression represents the ﬁrst-period transportation
costs. The second term displays the discounted second-period transportation costs, where 2/3
of the consumer population need to travel a distance of 1/6 on average whereas the remaining
1/3 of the population needs to travel a distance of 7/12 on average.





853δ3 − 1887δ2 − 4293δ + 10935
¢
(27 − 11δ)
2 − 6a(11δ + 15) + (43δ + 45)
#
. (7)
These outlays can be decomposed into ﬁnancial outlays (the sum of ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the com-
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119δ3 − 625δ2 + 297δ + 729
¢
(27 − 11δ)
2 − 18a(1 + δ)+( 1 1 δ +9 )
#
. (9)
28The ﬁrst term of the LHS of the above expression represents the ﬁrst-period transportation
costs. The second term of the LHS are the discounted second-period transportation costs with
account taken of consumers’ purchase decisions.
A comparison of total consumer expenditures with and without the ban on “higher-prices-
to-sheltered-consumers” shows that the total consumer expenditures are higher when the ban
applies. Comparison of Eq. (5) with Eq. (7) shows that the producer surplus is higher with a
ban on “higher-prices-to-sheltered-consumers”.
(ii) Consumer and Producer Surplus. The unweighted sum of producer and consumer surplus
is identical to the transportation costs incurred by customers. Comparison of Eq. (6) with Eq.
(9) shows that transportation costs are higher with a ban than without a ban. This completes
the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
The ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers” does not change ﬁrm A’s pricing in the shel-
tered segment. Consequently, social welfare in the sheltered segment remains identical to the
welfare in the absence of this ban. The ban, however, changes pricing behaviour and consumers’
decisions in the competitive segment.
(i) Consumer Surplus. The consumers’ ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial expenditures on the com-
petitive segment without a ban are given by Eq. (4). With a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-
customers”, total outlays become
t(1 − a)(61δ + 120)
96
. (10)
These outlays can be decomposed into ﬁnancial outlays (the sum of ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the com-
petitive segment)



















t(1 − a)(9δ +8 )
32
. (11)
The ﬁrst term of the LHS of the above expression reﬂects the ﬁrst-period transportation costs.
The second term represents the discounted second-period transportation costs: 3/4 of the con-
sumer population need to travel the distance 3/16 on average, whereas 1/4 needs to travel a
distance 9/16 on average.
29A simple comparison of Eqs. (4) and (10) shows that the consumer outlays are higher
without a ban. The discounted average prices are lower. In particular, average prices in the
ﬁrst-period are lower. The average second-period prices for A’s ﬁrst-period customer base are
lower, whereas they are higher for B’s ﬁrst-period customer base. In addition, more consumers
are served by their most preferred provider. The ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-customers”,
therefore, is consumer friendly and generates a higher consumer surplus.
Consider now the producer surplus. The above expressions show that proﬁts are higher
without a ban. Thus a ban intensiﬁes competition on the competitive segment.
(ii) Consumer and Producer Surplus. The eﬀect on total welfare from introducing this ban
amounts to a comparison of the transportation costs incurred by the consumers. Equations
(6) and (11) show that transportation costs are lower with a ban on “lower-prices-to-rival’s-
customers” than without a ban. This completes the proof.
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